Financial Crises and Climate Change by Jalles, João Tovar
 
REM WORKING PAPER SERIES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Financial Crises and Climate Change 
 
João Tovar Jalles 
 
REM Working Paper 0131-2020 
 
May 2020 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REM – Research in Economics and Mathematics 
Rua Miguel Lúpi 20, 
1249-078 Lisboa, 
Portugal 
 
 
 
 
 
ISSN 2184-108X 
 
Any opinions expressed are those of the authors and not those of REM. Short, up to 
two paragraphs can be cited provided that full credit is given to the authors. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REM – Research in Economics and Mathematics 
 
Rua Miguel Lupi, 20 
1249-078 LISBOA 
Portugal 
 
Telephone: +351 - 213 925 912 
E-mail: rem@iseg.ulisboa.pt 
 
https://rem.rc.iseg.ulisboa.pt/  
 
 
 
 
https://twitter.com/ResearchRem 
 
https://www.linkedin.com/company/researchrem/ 
 
https://www.facebook.com/researchrem/ 
 
 1 
 
Financial Crises and Climate Change* 
 
João Tovar Jalles# 
 May 2020 
 
Abstract 
 
We empirically assess by means of the local projection method, the impact of financial crises on 
climate change vulnerability and resilience. Using a new dataset covering 178 countries over the 
period 1995–2017, we observe that resilience to climate change shocks has been increasing and 
that advanced economies are the least vulnerable. Our econometric results suggest that financial 
crises (particularly systematic banking ones) tend to lead to a short-run deterioration in a country´s 
resilience to climate change. This effect is more pronounced in developing economies. In 
downturns, if an economy is hit by a financial crisis, climate change vulnerability increases. 
Results are robust to several sensitivity checks. 
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1. Introduction 
Climate change already poses a systemic risk to the global economy. The Global Financial 
Crisis reopened the debate on the compatibility between economic development and 
environmental protection but has also led to a wider discussion on the usefulness of environmental 
policies and actions within recovery packages.1 The current Covid19 pandemic, and the recession 
that will follow, will do the same. In both these cases, the resulting fall in economic activity did 
lead to reductions in energy consumption and, thus, carbon dioxide - the major greenhouse gas - 
emissions.2 Indeed, carbon dioxide has been shown to fluctuate with economic situations and to 
be highly (negatively) correlated with GDP and energy consumption (Gierdraitis et al., 2010; Lane, 
2011; Stavytskyy et al., 2016).3 More importantly, in contrast with the oil price crises of the 1970s, 
the last crisis did not lead to a structural change in the growth of emissions in the years that 
followed (Peters et al., 2011).4 Against this background, the Paris climate accord in 2015 – the 
COP21 – was a landmark effort on the part of countries to set and monitor commitments to mitigate 
global warming and the effects of climate change. 
For some authors, crises tend to lead to deferment and postponement of environmental projects 
and investments as surviving the crisis (and its subsequent recovery) becomes the aim, rather than 
becoming a “green” economy (Del Río and Labandeira, 2009). Others advocate the opposite, i.e., 
that crises provide an opportunity for developing and investing in low-carbon technologies that, in 
turn, could provide a way out of the downturn (Greenpeace, 2008). This paper aims to empirically 
test these two conflicting propositions and answer whether crises are environmentally friendly or 
not. A perusal of the literature reveals no such study.  
Specifically, we empirically assess the impact of (financial) crises on climate change taking 
advantage of a new dataset of climate change vulnerability and resilience developed by the Notre 
                                                 
1 Given the lockdown observed in many countries as consequence of the Covid19 pandemic, polluting emissions have 
been falling but many feel it will not fundamentally have a long-lasting impact on climate change. 
https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20200326-covid-19-the-impact-of-coronavirus-on-the-environment 
2 Several papers assessed the output-emissions decoupling hypothesis and how their cyclical relationship has changed 
over time (see e.g. Cohen et al., 2018). 
3 “The Panic of 1873” led to a global reduction of carbon dioxide emissions. The Great Depression of the 1930s led 
to an even larger reduction of emissions. Siddiqi (2000), looking at the Asian Financial Crisis, defended some positive 
consequences stemming from it to the global environment. 
4 This uncharacteristic bounce back in emissions can be attributed to: (1) the globally coordinated action of central 
banks and initial fiscal stimulus; (2) the easing of energy prices reducing pressure for structural changes; (3) the 
continuing and accelerated increase in coal-fired power (IEA, 2013). In contrast, Dauvergne (1999) looking at the 
Asian Financial Crisis, concluded that it contributed to extensive environmental changes. 
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Dame Global Adaptation Institute (ND-GAIN). We use a sample of 178 advanced and developing 
economies between 1995-2017 and we rely on Jorda’s (2005) local projection method to trace the 
short to medium-term impact of crises on climate change. We find that financial crises (particularly 
systematic banking ones) tend to lead to a short-run deterioration in a country´s resilience to 
climate change. This effect is more pronounced in emerging market economies. In downturns, if 
an economy is hit by a financial crisis, climate change vulnerability increases. 
 
2. Methodology 
We estimate and trace out the average response of climate change indices in the aftermath of 
financial crises following the approach proposed by Jordà (2005).5 The first regression 
specification takes the form: 
 
𝑦𝑖,𝑡+𝑘 − 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝛽𝑘𝐹𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + θX𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡      (1) 
 
in which 𝑦𝑖,𝑡+𝑘 denotes a climate change index in country i in period t+k; 𝛼𝑖 are country fixed 
effects included to control for unobserved cross-country heterogeneity; 𝜇𝑡 are time effects to control 
to control for global shocks; 𝐹𝐶𝑖,𝑡 is our financial crisis dummy variable, which takes value 1 when 
a financial crisis took place and zero otherwise. 𝐹𝐶𝑖,𝑡 takes the value of 1 for the starting year of a 
given financial crises and 0 otherwise (to improve the identification and minimize reverse 
causality). X𝑖,𝑡 is a set of controls including two lags of the dependent variable, two lags of the 
crisis variable and two lags of real GDP growth. 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is an i.i.d. disturbance term satisfying standard 
assumptions of zero mean and constant variance. Equation (1) is estimated via Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) for each k=0,..,7 with robust standard errors clustered at the country level. Impulse 
response functions (IRFs) are computed using the estimated coefficients 𝛽𝑘, and the confidence 
bands are obtained using the estimated standard errors of the coefficients 𝛽𝑘. 
York (2012) elaborated on the nonlinear effects of polluting emissions to an increase in 
income during economic expansions and contractions. For this reason, in a second specification, 
the dynamic response is allowed to vary with the state of the economy6: 
 
                                                 
5 This approach has been advocated by Romer and Romer (2017), as a flexible alternative to vector autoregressions. 
6 This is equivalent to the smooth transition autoregressive model developed by Granger and Terävistra (1993).  
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𝑦𝑖,𝑡+𝑘 − 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝛽𝑘
𝐿𝐹(𝑧𝑖,𝑡)𝐹𝐶𝑖,𝑡+𝛽𝑘
𝐻(1 − 𝐹(𝑧𝑖,𝑡))𝐹𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + θ𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  (2)                 
 
with 
 𝐹(𝑧𝑖𝑡) =
exp (−𝛾𝑧𝑖𝑡)
1+exp (−𝛾𝑧𝑖𝑡)
,     𝛾 > 0 
 
in which 𝑧𝑖𝑡 is an indicator of the state of the economy normalized to have zero mean and unit 
variance. Despite substantial progress in methodologies to calculate potential output, there is still 
not a widely accepted approach (Borio, 2013). Mindful of the criticisms surrounding the use of the 
Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter (such as the identification of spurious cycles - Cogley and Nason, 
1995), the state of the economy is measured by the output gap computed via the recent Hamilton 
(2018) filter. Fit is a smooth transition function used to estimate the climate change impact of 
financial crisis in expansions versus recessions. Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) set 𝛾 = 1.5. 
Results do not qualitatively change for alternative positive values of 𝛾. M is the same set of control 
variables used in the baseline specification, but now including also two lags of 𝐹(𝑧𝑖,𝑡). Equation 
(2) is also estimated using OLS. 
 
3. Data  
Our dependent variables are vulnerability and resilience to climate change as measured by the 
ND-GAIN indices, which capture a country’s overall susceptibility to climate-related disruptions 
and capacity to deal with the consequences of climate change, respectively.7 The composite indices 
are based on 45 indicators, of which 36 variables contributing to the vulnerability score and 9 
variables constituting the resilience score. Vulnerability refers to “a country’s exposure, 
sensitivity, and capacity to adapt to the impacts of climate change”. Resilience, on the other hand, 
assesses “a country’s capacity to apply economic investments and convert them to adaptation 
actions”. Figure 1 shows the time profile and box-whisker plots for both the vulnerability and 
resilience indices. We observe that resilience to climate change shocks has been increasing, 
particularly since the early 2000s. From the bottom charts, we see that advanced economies are 
the least vulnerable (and more resilient) to climate change. 
                                                 
7 The ND-GAIN database, covering 184 countries over the period 1995–2017, is available at https://gain.nd.edu/. 
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Financial crises come from Leaven and Valencia’s (2018) database which was recently 
updated, and which is publicly available. These include precise dating for (systemic) banking 
crises, currency crises, debt crises and sovereign debt restructurings. Real GDP is retrieved from 
the IMFs World Economic Outlook database.  
 
4. Results 
Figure 2 presents the results obtained by estimating equation (1). We observe that financial 
crises (irrespective of their type) tend to lead to a short-run deterioration in a country´s resilience 
to climate change (panel a). The resilience index falls by around 1 percent three years after the 
financial crisis (that is, two standard deviations). This suggests that financial crises negatively 
affect the ability to do climate friendly investments and/or take actions towards productive capacity 
Figure 1. Climate Change and Government Bond Spreads 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Source: ND-GAIN; authors' calculations. 
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adaptation/conversion. The main rationale is that crises, by making access to capital more difficult, 
negatively affect climate change mitigation efforts through their discouraging effects on 
investments (including those in low-carbon technologies) (Del Río and Labandeira, 2009). As both 
governments and the private sector focus on the recovery and on adapting their respective budgets, 
they shift priorities away from climate policies.8 The effect of crises on the vulnerability index is 
not statistically different from zero throughout the horizon considered. In panel b. we see that the 
negative impact on climate change resilience is driven particularly by the negative effect coming 
from systemic banking crises (and to a lesser extent, debt crises – not shown). 
 
 
 
Splitting the sample between 34 advanced and 144 developing countries yields the IRFs in 
Figure 3. We see that developing economies are those more negatively affected in their resilience 
capacity by financial crises. In this group of countries, the stock of capital is smaller and, hence, 
their larger difficulties in adapting existing production structures to mitigate the impacts of climate 
                                                 
8 Our results do not support the findings of Sobrino and Monzon (2014) who looked at the environmental effects of 
the Global Financial Crisis in Spain and found that it has led to higher energy efficiency on the road sector. 
Figure 2. Climate Change Responses to Financial Crises: Baseline 
a. All financial crises 
Resilience Vulnerability 
  
b. Banking crisis only 
Resilience Vulnerability 
  
Note: blue continuous line denotes the impulse response from equation 1. Dotted blue lines are the 90 percent 
confidence bands. The horizontal axis is expressed in annual frequency. t=0 is the starting year of a financial crisis. 
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change. In the advanced economies subsample climate change vulnerability increases in the very 
short-run (up to two years after the crisis).  
 
 
 
In Figure 4 we present the state-contingent results from estimating equation (2). In bad 
times, if an economy is hit by a financial crisis, climate change vulnerability increases, while 
resilience seems to be (statistically) unaffected. Depressed aggregate demand, the fall in the prices 
of some goods and lower economic capacity may encourage the consumption of goods with an 
inferior environmental quality (and lower prices) and to an over-exploitation of resources with 
associated environmental degradation (Del Río and Labandeira, 2009). Governments are also 
likely to avoid burdening business and industry with extra costs and regulation at a time when the 
economy is fragile and jobs may be at risk (Wooders and Runnalls, 2008).9 In recessionary times, 
                                                 
9 In fact, economic troubles ahead often prompt governments to loosen regulations. For instance, in the current 
Covid19 pandemic, the US´ Environmental Protection Agency has cited the pandemic as justification for a decision 
to suspend enforcement of pollution rules. https://www.nationalgeographic.com/science/2020/04/pollution-made-the-
pandemic-worse-but-lockdowns-clean-the-sky/ 
Figure 3. Climate Change Responses to Financial Crises: Advanced vs. Emerging 
Economies 
a. Advanced Economies 
Resilience Vulnerability 
  
b. Emerging Economies 
Resilience Vulnerability 
  
Note: blue continuous line denotes the impulse response from equation 1. Dotted blue lines are the 90 percent 
confidence bands. The horizontal axis is expressed in annual frequency. t=0 is the starting year of a financial crisis. 
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carbon lock-in is also more likely as lower energy prices, reduce the economic viability for the 
development and operation of cleaner technologies. In good times, economies hit by a financial 
crisis see their vulnerability to climate change dropping continuously and persistently (becoming 
statistically significant in medium-run, that is, six years after the crisis). 
 
 
 
We performed several sensitivity exercises. First, as shown by Tuelings and Zubanov (2010), 
a possible bias from estimating equation (1) using country-fixed effects is that the error term may 
have a non-zero expected value. This would lead to a bias of the estimates that is a function of k. 
Equation (1) was re-estimated by excluding country fixed effects. Results (not shown but available 
upon request) suggest that this bias is negligible. Second, equation (1) was re-estimated for 
different lags (l) of the control variables. Results (not shown but available upon request) confirm 
that previous findings are not lag-sensitive. Third, as an alternative variable measuring economic 
Figure 4. Climate Change Responses to Financial Crises: The Role of Economic Conditions  
a. Resilience 
Recession Expansion  
  
b. Vulnerability 
Recession Expansion  
  
Note: blue continuous line denotes the impulse response from equation 2. Dotted blue lines are the 90 percent 
confidence bands. The yellow continuous line represents the unconditional baseline IRF from equation 1 (for 
comparison purposes). The horizontal axis is expressed in annual frequency. t=0 is the starting year of a financial 
crisis. 
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slack in equation (2), we also considered economic recessions identified using the Harding and 
Pagan (2002) algorithm to identify turning points. Results remained qualitatively unchanged.  
 
5. Conclusion  
We provided empirical evidence on the impact of financial crises on climate change for a 
sample of 178 countries between 1995-2017. We relied on the local projection method to plot 
impulse responses to find that crises (particularly banking ones) lead to a short-run fall in 
countries´ resilience to climate change (driven greatly by developing economies). In recessionary 
periods, an economy hit by a financial crisis, should expect is vulnerability to climate change to 
rise. 
Econometric evidence presented here has clear policy implications, especially for developing 
countries that are relatively more vulnerable to risks associated with climate change. For policy 
makers, it is important so see financial crises as opportunities to make big reductions in emissions 
that one can then lock in, and ensure that energy pricing, investments and other policies are 
conducive toward innovations that create low-carbon societies. Although climate change is 
inevitable, the negative effect of crises on climate resilience shows that enhancing structural 
resilience through mitigation and adaptation, strengthening financial resilience through 
macroprudential preventive regulation and insurance schemes and improving economic 
diversification and policy management can help cope with the consequences of climate change for 
economic development.  
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